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Coalitions durables dans les communs 
Résumé 
Il est bien connu que l’absence de coopération entre plusieurs agents exploitant une 
ressource renouvelable en accès libre peut conduire à son extinction. Ce papier se 
propose d’étudier la relation existante entre le nombre potentiel d’exploitant et l’état du 
stock lorsque les agents sont hétérogènes en termes de coût et qu’ils peuvent former des 
coalitions. Un modèle bio-économique est construit combinant une approche de viabilité 
et la théorie des jeux afin d’analyser l’impact de contraintes bio-économiques sur l’état 
et la dynamique de la ressource. Fondée sur la valeur de Shapley, une mesure de la 
contribution marginale des exploitants à la durabilité de la ressource est définie. Elle 
montre que la stabilité de la grande coalition est possible pour des montants élevés du 
stock. En revanche, pour de faibles niveaux, l’exploitant le plus efficace joue le rôle de 
dictateur.  
Mots-clés :  ressource renouvelable, durabilité, programmation dynamique, coalition, 
stratégie maxmin, valeur de Shapley, noyau de viabilité 
Sustainable coalitions in the commons 
Abstract 
It is well known that the non-cooperation among agents harvesting a renewable resource 
is critical for its sustainable management. The present paper gives insights on the 
complex balance between coalitions structure, resource state or dynamics and agents’ 
heterogeneity to avoid bio-economic collapses. A model bringing together coalition 
games and a viability approach is proposed to focus on the compatibility between bio-
economic constraints and an exploited common stock dynamics. It is examined to what 
extent cooperation promotes sustainability. Based on the Shapley value, a measure of the 
marginal contribution of the users to the sustainability of the resource is proposed. It 
suggests that the stability of the grand coalition occurs for large enough stocks. By 
contrast, for lower levels of resource, the most efficient user plays the role of a dictator. 
Keywords:  renewable resource, dynamic game, coalition, maxmin strategy, shapley 
value, viability kernel 
JEL : Q20 
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Abstract
It is well known that the non-cooperation among agents harvesting a renew-
able resource is critical for its sustainable management. The present paper
gives insights on the complex balance between coalitions structure, resource
state or dynamics and agents’ heterogeneity to avoid bio-economic collapses.
A model bringing together coalition games and a viability approach is pro-
posed to focus on the compatibility between bio-economic constraints and
an exploited common stock dynamics. It is examined to what extent coop-
eration promotes sustainability. Based on the Shapley value, a measure of
the marginal contribution of the users to the sustainability of the resource is
proposed. It suggests that the stability of the grand coalition occurs for large
enough stocks. By contrast, for lower levels of resource, the most eﬃcient
user plays the role of a dictator.
Keywords: renewable resource, dynamic game, coalition, maxmin
strategy, shapley value, viability kernel.
JEL: Q20
1. Introduction
This paper deals with the cooperation among users harvesting a renew-
able resource. According to recent studies (MEA, 2005), biodiversity and
exploited renewable resources are under extreme pressure worldwide. For
instance, three quarters of ﬁsh stocks worldwide are maximally exploited
or over-exploited (FAO, 2004). Hence sustainability is nowadays a major
concern of international agreements and guidelines to ﬁsheries management
(ICES, 2004). In this context, exploited biodiversity management involves
restoration and conservation objectives, with ecological and economic di-
mensions including the identiﬁcation of desirable levels of stocks and prof-
itability from catches. It inevitably raises the question of the number of
active potential users of the resource and the way they can cooperate. To
avoid possible future collapses of the stocks, catches and rents, we need to
determine the conditions under which cooperation can be sustainable.
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2007) provides some important insights on strategic interaction between
users exploiting a renewable resource. In particular, the relationship between
the number of active agents and the sustainability of the involved stock has
been studied in static non cooperative game by Mesterton-Gibbons (1993)
or Sandal & Steinshamn (2004) in presence of users diﬀering with respect
to their eﬃciency in terms of harvesting cost. These models both show
how the larger the stock, higher the number of active players is. Mesterton-
Gibbons (1993) derives this result by considering rent maximising users who
take into account the stock externality arising from the actions of the other
users. Similarly, Sandal & Steinshamn (2004) investigate another strategic
interaction between users relying on a Cournot competition. They also
introduce an incumbent agent whose role is to achieve sustainability by
setting the resource at its steady state.
The question of coalitions has also received an important attention in the
context of renewable resource management. What distinguishes renewable
resources coalition game from many other coalition games is that major ex-
ternalities occur. A particular attention has been paid to coalition issues in
ﬁsheries economics (Kaitala & Lindroos, 1998; Arnason et al., 2000; Burton,
2003; Lindroos, 2004a). The need for the research of cooperative ﬁsheries
management arises from the current practice of international negotiations
and implementation of multi-country ﬁsheries agreements. In this context,
the coalition game theory literature focused on the formation of the coali-
tions, their stability and the way the beneﬁts of cooperation are shared
between the users. Kaitala & Lindroos (1998) show in a three-player game
that there is a partial cooperative equilibrium stock level that is higher than
the non-cooperative stock level (Clark, 1980), though lower than the fully
cooperative stock level (Clark & Munro, 1975). Lindroos (2004a) extends
these results in a four-player game. In this perspective, of particular interest
is the question raised by the stability of the coalition and especially the grand
coalition. Hence, Arnason et al. (2000) analyse the case of Atlanto-Scandian
herring and points out that Norway is a crucial country for any coalition
to be stable. This result is related to Lindroos (2004a) who considers the
possibility of veto countries. Using a partition function game as in Bloch
(1996) and Finus (2001), Pintassilgo (2003) derives general results regard-
ing the stability of coalition structures in straddling stock ﬁsheries. Kronbak
& Lindroos (2007) predict a stable grand coalition while Lindroos (2004b)
points out the connections between safe minimum biological levels and sta-
bility of full cooperation. This literature also proposes allocation rules of the
cooperation beneﬁts between the members of a coalition (Lindroos, 2004b;
Kronbak & Lindroos, 2007; Li, 1999). These allocations solutions include
2Shapley value (probably the most used), nucleolus and tau-value.
Our paper questions the shape and size of coalitions with respect to sus-
tainable requirements for the exploited renewable resource. Although our
work is in direct line with the models of the literature, it gives new insights
by considering a dynamic game focusing on viability constraints. Thus our
model diﬀers in several ways. First our approach is dynamic in the sense
that the analysis is not restricted to steady states and equilibrium yield.
Second, a viability viewpoint is adopted to cope with sustainability. The
viability (or viable control) approach does not strive to identify optimal or
steady state paths, but rather aims at identifying the conditions that al-
low desirable objectives or constraints to be fulﬁlled over time, considering
both present and future states (Baumgartner & Quaas, 2009; Bene et al.,
2001). As emphasized in DeLara & Doyen (2008) or Martinet & Doyen
(2007), viability is closely related to the maximin (Rawlsian) approach with
respect to intergenerational equity. Viability may also allow for the satisfac-
tion of both economic and environmental constraints and is, in this respect,
a multi-criteria approach. Viability analysis has been applied to renew-
able resources management and especially to ﬁsheries (see, e.g. Bene et al.
(2001); Eisenack et al. (2006); Martinet et al. (2007), but also to broader
(eco)-system dynamics (Cury et al., 2005; Doyen et al., 2007; Bene & Doyen,
2008). Relationships between sustainable management objectives and refer-
ence points as adopted in the ices precautionary approach are discussed in
DeLara et al. (2007). Here the viability framework allows us to exhibit the
conditions under which coalitions can fulﬁll positive proﬁtability and con-
servation objectives along time, considering both present and future states
of the renewable resource system.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the descrip-
tion of the dynamic bio-economic model together with the proﬁtability con-
straints. Section 3 provides the results related to the shape of the viable
coalitions with respect to the level of the resource. The contribution of the
agents to the viability is also analyzed using the minimum number of active
players and the Shapley value of the game. The last section concludes.
2. The dynamic model
The dynamics of a renewable resource stock x(t) ∈ R+ is given by
x(t + 1) = f(x(t) − h(t)), t = 0,1,...,T, (1)
where catches h(t) occur at the beginning of the period. The natural resource
productivity is represented by f. We denote by K the capacity charge of
3the resource deﬁned by
K = sup(x ≥ 0,f(x) ≥ x).
We consider that the resource is exploited by n agents, implying an amount





with ei ∈ [0,1] standing for the eﬀort (or harvesting mortality) of each
agents i ∈ {1,..,n}. Since take-oﬀ can not exceed resource stock, a scarcity
constraint holds:
0 ≤ h(t) ≤ x(t), (2)




The rent of each agent i is deﬁned by:
Πi(x(t),ei(t)) = pei(t)x(t) − ciei(t),
where ci measures the cost per unit of eﬀort and the price p of the resource
is assumed to keep constant. The rent is positive for each agent i when the






We assume that the agents are heterogeneous in the sense that they diﬀer
in their cost:
c1 < c2 < .... < cn−1 < cn,
or equivalently in their open access stocks
xOA
1 < xOA
2 < .... < xOA
n−1 < xOA
n .
It is worth noting that two kinds of externalities occur in this game as
every agent may alter both the current catches (and rents) of others agents
by the scarcity constraint (2) and also the future catches of agents through
harvesting and dynamics (1) which impact the stock for the next period.
Sustainability problem:. The dynamic problem that we handle is to deter-
mine coalitions S ⊂ {1,...,n}, harvesting strategies among the coalition
ei(t), i ∈ S and a stock path x(t) which ensures that the aggregated rent of
the agents i belonging to the coalition S remains strictly positive, i.e.:
 
i∈S
Πi(x(t),ei(t)) > 0, t = 0,1,...,T
4Cooperation among a group of players corresponds to the establishment of a
management organization with the purpose of managing and protecting the
resource stocks jointly. Such a proﬁtability constraint entails the following
resource viability requirement captured by the critical bio-economic level xS




The present paper intends to give insights on the shape and size of the
coalition S regarding the initial value of the stock x0, the resource dynamics
f, the economic context (c and p) and these sustainability goals.
Viable states and viability kernel:. To achieve this, we deﬁne the viability
kernels ViabS(t) for a given coalition S through backward induction inspired
by dynamic programming. First, at the terminal date T, we set
ViabS(T) =
 
x | x > xS 
For any time t = 0,1,...,T − 1, we compute the viability kernel ViabS(t) at







   
   
   
 
∃ei ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ S,
 









∈ ViabS(t + 1)




The previous deﬁnition stresses the fact that the agents among the coalition
cooperate for sustainable proﬁtability goals applying both in the present
and the future while the outsiders of the coalition act as singleton and are
myopic regarding proﬁtability goals. When the users of the resource co-
operate within a coalition, the positive proﬁtability condition holds for the
whole coalition. The myopic behavior of the outsiders can encompass several
strategies including optimizing, inertial ones which are potentially dangerous
and risky for the resource.
A simple game formulation:. The previous geometric deﬁnition of viability
kernels can be associated with the following ”‘maxmin”’ (supinf) functional
formulation which points out the ”simple” (0 or 1) nature of the game. Let
us consider the indicator function 1 IViabS(t)(.) deﬁned by:
1 IViabS(t)(x) =
 
1 if x ∈ ViabS(t)
0 if x  ∈ ViabS(t).
5Such indicator function 1 IViabS(t)(.) turns out to be the solution of the fol-
lowing maxmin dynamic programming equation:

         
         
VS(T,x) = 1 I{x>xS}(x)
VS(t,x) = sup 


ei, i ∈ S






















t = 0,1,..,T − 1
Such a formulation also highlights the asymmetric feature between the goals
of outsiders-insiders.
Viable feedbacks:. Given a resource state x at time t, the viable feedbacks
for each coalition S denoted by e∗
S(t,x) = (e∗



















∈ ViabS(t + 1)
∀j / ∈ S, ∀ej ≥ 0 s.t. Πj(x,ej) ≥ 0,
(3)
Such a viable feedback eﬀort e∗
S(t,x) exists as soon as the resource state x
belongs to the viability kernel ViabS(t). Of course the design of such viable
eﬀorts require the knowledge of the whole sequence of viability kernels.
3. Results
Hereafter, the stock productivity f : R+ → R+ is assumed to be con-
tinuously increasing f′ > 0 and to satisfy f(0) = 0. We also assume that
the open-access stocks xOA







⊂ ]0,K[ = {x ≥ 0, f(x) > x}. (4)
3.1. Viable coalitions and states:
Let us ﬁrst identify the viable stocks through the computation of the
viability kernels for every coalition.
Theorem 1 The viability kernels at time t (t < T) are












for j < n
6• ViabS(t) = Viabe S(t) for   S = ∪i ({1...i} ⊂ S)
The proofs of Theorem 1 are exposed within the appendix1. Theorem
1 identiﬁes what are the size and the composition of the viable coalition of
users with respect to the stock of the resource. To illustrate this, consider
the Table 1 where we can distinguish the viability kernels in the case with








Viab{2} = Viab{3} = ∅
Table 1: Viability kernels with three players n = 3.
The tragedy of open-access revisited:. It turns out that cooperation promotes
the viability as the higher cooperation between users is, the larger is the
viability domain. In particular, the grand coalition N = {1,2,3} (social






the smallest viable coalition occurs with singletons. In particular, viability
vanishes for singletons S = {2} or S = {3} since both viability kernels
Viab{2}(t) and Viab{3}(t) are empty. Another signiﬁcant viable coalition
is formed by agents 1 and 2. However viability is reduced in this partial
cooperation case as Viab{1,2}(t) is strictly contained in Viab{1,2,3}(t). Of
interest is the fact that the coalition formed by players 1 and 3 is equivalent
to singleton {1} emphasizing that the role of player 3 is minor in this case.
The Shapley value developed in subsection 3.5 will highlight this idea by
computing viability contribution values for the diﬀerent players.
Agent 1 is a veto player:. These kernels also emphasize that player 1 is
a veto player as its presence is always required for the cooperation to be
viable. In other words, as soon as the most eﬃcient user 1 is not a member
of the coalition, the associated viability kernels are empty. In particular,
the only viable singleton is S = {1}. Again, the Shapley value developed in
subsection 3.5 will give more insights on this veto and dictatorship situations.
1Note that all the results could be extended to the inﬁnite horizon case since it turns
out that the viability kernels do not depend on time.
73.2. A focus on the grand coalition (social viability):
Coordination promotes the viability as the grand coalition N = {1,...,n}





. Such a conﬁguration
allows to recover several well-known cases of bio-economic states. In par-
ticular it turns out that the maximum economic states xmey belongs to the
viability kernel ViabN of the grand coalition. These maximum economic
states xmey actually depends on the agents i features since they rely on the
maximization of proﬁts which are associated to costs ci as follows:
(xmey
i ,emey
i ) ∈ Arg max (
(x,e)
f(x(1 − e)) = x
Πi(x,e).
Corollary 1 Maximum economic states xmey
i > 0 are viable for the grand
coalition: xmey
i ∈ ViabN(t) for any i ∈ N.
The proof, exposed in AppendixA.5, relies on the idea that the maximum
economic equilibrium is always larger than the open-access equilibrium.
Similarly the non cooperative equilibrium xNC in the sense of Mesterton-
Gibbons (1993) belongs to the viability kernel ViabN of the grand coalition.
If it exists, such non cooperative equilibrium xNC is the solution of the
problem:
Πi(xNC,eNC




i ei)) = xNC
Πi(xNC,ei), i = 1,..,n
Corollary 2 Non cooperative equilibrium xNC > 0 is viable for the grand
coalition: xNC ∈ ViabN(t).
Again the proof relies on the idea that the non cooperative equilibrium
xNC is always larger than the open-access equilibria xOA
i and consequently
xOA
1 . However this assertion sounds counterintuitive as a non cooperative
equilibrium is not a good candidate for a full cooperation. Actually, this
non cooperative equilibrium xNC has some cooperative feature because it is
a steady state for which the agents implicitly agree on setting the resource
at some stationary (and thus sustainable or viable) level.
3.3. Minimum number of players
Given a stock level x, we deﬁne by n∗(x) the minimum number of players
in a viable coalition by:
n∗(x) = min(|S| | x ∈ ViabS(0))
where |S| stands for the cardinal of the coalition S.





































Figure 1: A numerical example of minimal players n
∗(x) for a viable coalition S.




1 < x < xOA
j+1
 
which is illustrated by the stepwise increasing function displayed in Figure
3.3. This minimum number of active players in a coalition in our dynamic
framework is a generalization of the steady state participation condition of
Mesterton-Gibbons (1993). It is worth noting that our approach expands
this result since steady states are particular cases of viability (DeLara &
Doyen (2008)).
Let us emphasize that the number of viable players increases with stock.
In particular, this suggests that the grand coalition is stable whenever the
stock is large enough. This assertions is examined in detail in section 3.5
through the shapley value.
3.4. Viable eﬀorts for the viable coalitions:
The next step of the analysis is to exhibit the viable eﬀort of the members
of the coalition. Applying the ”dynamic programming” characterization of
viable feedbacks displayed in (3), we deduce a characterization of the viable
feedbacks e∗
S(t,x) for a given coalition S. As shown in proof AppendixA
from equation (A.1), we obtain
Theorem 2 The viable feedbacks e∗
S(t,x) = (e∗
i(t,x))i∈S for a coalition S




































where 0 < α < 1.
Note that several catch eﬀorts can satisfy such linear inequalities and
consequently a ﬂexibility occurs in the decision process. Among these viable
choices, one can favor eﬃcient or conservative rules or diﬀerent trade-oﬀs
between ecological or economic performances.
In order to prevent the outsiders to collapse the resource and the rents,
the coalition has to manage the resource in a way that the outsiders become
passive. The coalition has to maintain the resource in its viability domain
to guarantee its sustainability. Actually, the coalition achieves this by neu-
tralizing the outsiders in a sustainable way. This neutralization occurs by
avoiding every proﬁtability for outsiders and more speciﬁcally by maintain-
ing the resource below open-access levels for outsiders. In such a context,
since all the outsiders of the coalition are passive, the coalition does not
have to take into account that it can play against either a coalition formed
by the outsiders or against individual outsiders.
3.5. Marginal contribution to viability
We deﬁne a Shapley measure of the marginal contribution of agents i




(|S| − 1)!(n − |S|)!
n!
 
1 IViabS(x) − 1 IViabS\{i}(x)
 
Applying for instance Lemma 2 (p 362) in Aubin (2007) for simple games,
we obtain the following characterization of Shapley value:










n∗(x) for i ≤ j
0 for i > j
Consequently, the Shapley value captures the fact that whenever the
users are active, they contribute positively and to the same amount to the
sustainability of the resource. By contrast, passive players contribute for
nothing to the sustainability of the resource. Our approach diﬀers from the
cooperative coalition games in which the Shapley value is used to compute
the shares of the cooperative rent inside the members of the coalition who
have created the surplus. Our measure of the marginal contribution to
the viability kernel is more qualitative and relies on the ability of players




agent 1 | 0 | 100% | 50% | 33%
agent 2 | 0 | 0 | 50% | 33%
agent 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33%
Table 2: Shapley values Shi(x) for n = 3 players
to maintain a safe exploitation of the resource. Applied to our 3 players’
example, it gives the table 2.
Therefore, the value of the marginal contribution Shi of each user deter-
mines whether his participation to a coalition is required or not. Note also
that in any case, an equity rule among the active players holds true as the
”cake” is shared in n∗(x) equal parts. In particular, when the stock is high
enough to ensure the active participation of all players, their contributions to
the sustainability of the resource are identical. It means that all the agents
have the same power to sustain the stock. This situation requires a global
cooperation within a coalition. It turns out that the most eﬃcient users
cannot displace the less eﬃcient users. At the opposite, when the initial






, only the most eﬃcient
agent and veto player is active and can contribute to the sustainability of
the resource. No cooperation with the other agents is required. An inter-
mediate or partial coalition involving an active contribution of player 2 is
viable but the veto player 1 has to be always involved as expected.
Corollary 3 Agent 1 is a veto player if x > xOA
1 .
This corollary directly stems from the fact that Sh1(x) > 0 for any
x > xOA
1 .















This paper has analyzed the conditions under which cooperation of active
heterogeneous users within coalition is required to promote the bio-economic
viability of a renewable resource. We have proposed a dynamic model bring-
ing together coalition games and a viability approach to focus on the com-
patibility between bio-economic constraints and an exploited common stock
dynamics. The model allows ﬁrst to revisit the tragedy of open-access and
the seminal work of Hardin as it is showed to what extent lack of cooperation
11reduces or jeopardize the viability of the whole bio-economic system. Focus-
ing on the grand coalition, it is shown how the usual ”sustainable” (steady)
states including the maximum economic yield (MEY) are particular cases
of viability. We have also determined the minimum number of viable play-
ers expanding the equilibrium approach of Mesterton-Gibbons (1993) and
Sandal & Steinshamn (2004) to a more dynamic context. Using Shapley
value, we assess the contribution of agent to sustainability pointing out sit-
uations of veto or dictator players as in Arnason et al. (2000) or Lindroos
(2004a). Such a study stresses the fact that diversiﬁcation in technologies
(ratio costs-catchability) is relevant for high levels of stock while special-
ization, rationalization and dictatorship situations are well-suited for low
resource. This suggests how the grand coalition is stable for large resource
levels which reinforces assertions of Pintassilgo (2003); Kronbak & Lindroos
(2007) and Lindroos (2004b).
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ticipants at the EAERE2009 conference in Amsterdam (Netherlands).
12AppendixA. Appendix: the proofs
For sake of clarity, we introduce the following notations and lemmas
• The vector of eﬀorts made by coalition Sj = {1,...,j} is denoted by
eSj = (e1,...,ej).





















Lemma 1 If x > xOA
1 then m = infe∈Aj(x)
 j
i=1 ei = 0.
Proof. If x > xOA
1 then Aj(x)  = ∅. Then pick up some e = (e1,...,ej) ∈
Aj(x). First since ei ≥ 0, it is clear that
 j
i=1 ei ≥ 0 and thus m ≥ 0. Now
assume for a while that m > 0. It means that for any integer k ∈ N there









But taking the sequence ek′ = ek










i ≤ 0.5 ∗ (m + 1/k).
For k large enough, we claim that 0.5 ∗ (m + 1





and a contradiction occurs.
Lemma 2 ∀x ∈ ]0,K[, we have f(x) > x and x > f−1(x).
Proof. The ﬁrst part comes from assumption 4. Since the function f is
continuously increasing, it is a bijection and the second part of the lemma
is proved.
13AppendixA.1. For the grand coalition S=N
At the date t = T, we have
ViabN(T) = {x > xN = xOA
1 }





1 , ∃e ∈ ∆n s.t.
   
   
 
 n
i=1 Πi(x,ei) > 0,
f(x(1 −
 n
i=1 ei)) ∈ ViabN(T)
 
Thus



























Therefore ViabN(T −1) =
 
x > xOA




. From the properties
of the function f depicted in 4, we have max
 
xOA







ViabN(T − 1) =]xOA
1 ,+∞[
Now let us assume the viability domain for the grand coalition S = N
at time t + 1 is ViabN(t + 1) = {x > xOA




x | x > xOA



















AppendixA.2. The coalition S = {1,...,j}.
Let us consider the case the coalition S is formed by agents 1 to j, i.e.
S = {1,...,j}.
At the date t = T, we have
ViabN(T) = {x > x{1,...,j} = xOA
1 }
At time t = T − 1, we have





   
   












14We have to specify at this stage what is the behavior of agent j +1 which is
outside the coalition. We distinguish two cases according to whether player
j + 1 is passive or remains active.
• If x ∈]xOA
1 ,xOA
j+1[ then players i = j +1,...,n become passive because
if they aim at having a positive rent their eﬀort are null ei = 0. Then











1 ⇒ f(x) > xOA
1 .
From lemma (2), we have xOA





Thus the viability domain is ]xOA
1 ,xOA
j+1[⊂ Viab{1,...,j}(T − 1)
• If x ≥ xOA
j+1, the stock of the resource is too high to ensure a positive
rent for the coalition S = {1,...,j} whatever the eﬀort played by
player j + 1,..,n. Indeed, in that case a feasible reply of player j + 1
against the coalition S = {1,...,j} is to harvest ej+1 = 1−
 j
i=1 ei ≥ 0
since it induces Πj+1 = ej+1(px − cj+1) ≥ 0 . Such a catch strategy
entails the extinction of the resource as f(x(1 −
 j
i=1 ei) − ej+1) =
f(0) = 0. Therefore in that case [xOA
j+1,∞[
 
Viab{1,...,j}(T − 1) = ∅.
Thus ]xOA
1 ,xOA
j+1[= Viab{1,...,j}(T − 1).
Now let us assume the viability domain for the coalition S = {1,...,j} at
time t+1 is Viab{1,...,j}(t+1) =]xOA
1 ,xOA












Again we have to distinguish two cases:
• If x ≥ xOA
j+1, the stock of the resource is too high to ensure a positive
rent for the coalition S = {1,...,j} whatever the eﬀort played by
player j + 1. Indeed, in that case a feasible reply of player j + 1
against the coalition S = {1,...,j} is to harvest e∗
j+1 = 1 −
 j
i=1 ei
for any e ∈ Aj(x). Such a catch strategy entails the extinction of the
resource as f(x(1 −
 j







• If x < xOA
j+1, player j+1 becomes passive because if he aims at having a
positive rent its eﬀort is null ej+1 = 0. Then using the viable feedbacks



























































The RHS of the inequality is positive since from lemma (2) we have
x > xOA




. However we have to take into account that the

























with 0 < α < 1
AppendixA.3. The coalition S such that 1 / ∈ S:
At the date t = T, we have ViabS(T) = {x > xS} with xS > xOA
1 .
At time t = T − 1, we deduce






   
 
   
   
∃e ∈ AS, ∀(el)l/ ∈S, Πl(x,el) ≥ 0
f













Consider x > xS > xOA
1 and assume for a while that there exists a relevant
e = (ei)i∈S ∈ AS. Set the eﬀort of player 1 to e1 = 1−
 
i∈S ei ≥ 0 and the
eﬀort of other players l outside the coalition to zero el = 0. The strategy
of outsiders l  = 1 is admissible as their proﬁt Πl(x,el) = el(px − cl) = 0 is
zero. The strategy of outsider 1 is also admissible as x > xOA
1 = c1
p and its
proﬁt satisﬁes Π1(x,e1) = e1(px − c1) ≥ 0. However with such a strategy,
the dynamics of the stock collapses as
f






l =1, l/ ∈S
el)

 = f(0) = 0 < xS
which leads to a contradiction. Consequently ViabS(T − 1) = ∅. Therefore
by backward induction ViabS(t) = ∅ for t < T.
AppendixA.4. The coalition   S such that ViabS(t) = Viabe S(t) for   S = ∪i ({1...i} ⊂ S)
We assume that 1 ∈ S. Let us write S =   S
 
S+ where   S = {1,...,j∗}.
At the date t = T, the equality holds true since
ViabS(T) = {x > xOA
1 } = Viabe S(T)
16At time t = T − 1, we know that Viabe S =]xOA
1 ,xOA
j∗+1[.
First pick up some x ∈ Viabe S. Then there exists a strategy ee S ∈ Ae S
such that for all outsider l ∈ N\  S for every choice el ensuring positive rent












Let us derive the viable strategy e′
S for the coalition S from the viable
strategy e′




ei if i ∈   S
0 if i ∈ S+
It turns out that
• e′
S ∈ AS
• for all outsider l ∈ N\S, for every choice el ensuring a positive rent






















∈ Viabe S(T) = ViabS(T).
We deduce that x ∈ ViabS(T − 1).
Now pick some x ∈ ViabS(T − 1) and let us prove that x ∈]xOA
1 ,xOA
j∗+1[.
Assume for a while that x ≥ xOA
j∗+1. Then whatever feasible strategy of the
coalition eS ∈ AS is, a feasible reply of player j∗ +1 against the coalition S
is to harvest ej∗+1 = 1−
 
i∈S ei ≥ 0 since it induces to Πj∗+1 = ej∗+1(px−
cj∗+1) ≥ 0 . Such a catch strategy entails the extinction of the resource
as f(x(1 −
 j∗
i=1 ei − ej∗+1)) = f(0) = 0 < xS. Consequently we derive a
contradiction.




Similar backward induction reasonings allow to generalize the previous
result at any time t < T.
AppendixA.5. Proof of corollary 1
Proof. Assume for a while that 0 < xmey




i . Thus Πi(xmey
i ,emey
i ) = pemey
i (xmey
i − xOA
i ) = 0 with emey
i = 0. Conse-
quently, xmey
i = f(xmey
i ). As xmey
i ≤ xOA
1 ≤ xOA
i ≤ K, by assumption (4),
we deduce that x = 0 which is contradictory.
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